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Robustness of Airline Alliance Route Networks
Abstract
The aim of this study is to analyze the robustness of the three major air-
line alliances’ (i.e., Star Alliance, oneworld and SkyTeam) route networks.
Firstly, the normalization of a multi-scale measure of vulnerability is pro-
posed in order to perform the analysis in networks with di↵erent sizes, i.e.,
number of nodes. An alternative node selection criterion is also proposed in
order to study robustness and vulnerability of such complex networks, based
on network e ciency. And lastly, a new procedure –the inverted adaptive
strategy– is presented to sort the nodes in order to anticipate network break-
down. Finally, the robustness of the three alliance networks are analyzed
with (1) a normalized multi-scale measure of vulnerability, (2) an adaptive
strategy based on four di↵erent criteria and (3) an inverted adaptive strategy
based on the e ciency criterion. The results show that Star Alliance has the
most resilient route network, followed by SkyTeam and then oneworld. It
was also shown that the inverted adaptive strategy based on the e ciency
criterion –inverted e ciency– shows a great success in quickly breaking net-
works similar to that found with betweenness criterion but with even better
results.
Keywords: Alliance route network, Complex networks, Robustness, Airline
alliances, Airport disclousure, Intentional attacks
1. Introduction
The restructuring of airline activities into alliances has been one of the
major traits of this industry since the beginning of the 90s, and over the
last decade most Full-Service Carriers and regional airlines have participated
in an airline alliance. Airlines join alliances for several reasons (Gaggero
and Bartolini, 2012). First, alliance members can benefit from economies of
scale and density: without having to increase investment in aircraft, alliance
members can extend their route network and o↵er a wider range of fre-
quency to customers on selected routes. Furthermore, alliance members can
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explore easier ways to collaborate with other members through codesharing,
joint-ventures or even merger and acquisitions. Finally, alliance members
can benefit from the joint venture by o↵ering benefits to customers (e.g.,
frequent-flyer programs) or from the joint purchase of supplies such as fuel.
In respect to consumer welfare, airline alliances lower the fares of interline
flights, which compensates for the fare increases on interhub flights (Brueck-
ner, 2001; Brueckner et al., 2011). However, it must be noted that the com-
petence of alliance members to coordinate routes and fares is an important
requirement for passengers to realize these benefits (Wan et al., 2009).
When an airline joins an alliance, the reliability of its services o↵ered
to customers not only depends on the flights the airline operates, but also
on the operations of the rest of the alliance members, since most of the
routes o↵ered by alliances are operated on a hub-and-spoke basis. Although
airline alliances have been formed for operational and competitive reasons,
the attachment to an alliance can determine the robustness of the airline
network.
The Airline alliance route networks (AARNs) are constructed as an ag-
gregation of the airlines’ route networks belonging to the alliance. These net-
works can be considered as a multilayered network (Cardillo et al., 2013), and
constitute an intermediate level of analysis of air transport networks, between
airline route networks and global or regional networks (Lordan et al., 2014a).
The aim of the present study is to analyze the vulnerability of AARNs to
errors (i.e., the random isolation of an airport) and attacks (i.e., isolation of
well-connected airports with the aim of causing the maximum damage to the
route network). This assessment is performed by two di↵erent approaches:
first, using a multi-scale measure of vulnerability (Boccaletti et al., 2007),
and second, examining the e↵ect of the disconnection of a fraction f of well-
connected nodes on the size of the overall giant component. This study can
shed light on the robustness of real networks not only for the special case of
airline alliances but also for networks sharing similar topological properties.
2. Methods
2.1. Vulnerability
In Boccaletti et al. (2007), a multi-scale measure of the vulnerability of
a graph G is defined by introducing the coe cient p to the characteristic
formula of the average edge betweenness as:
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where nij(l) is the number of geodesics (i.e., shortest paths) from node
i to node j that contain the edge l, and nij is the total number of shortest
paths. The scale parameter p > 0 acts as an exponent of each value of
edge betweenness, and its inverse value as an exponent of the sum of all
(powered) edge betweenness. For instance, b2 (G) is the square root of the
average square edge betweenness of the graph G.
To compare the vulnerability of two networks G and G0 with similar
structural properties, the first step is to compute b1 for both graphs. If
b1(G) < b1(G0), then G is more robust (less vulnerable) than G0. If b1(G) =
b1(G0), then the values of bp for values of p > 1 must be computed until
bp(G) 6= bp(G0). Then, the network with the smallest value of bp will be the
most robust one. In general, the full multi-scale sequence of betweenness co-
e cients (bp(G))p 1 must be considered in order to get an accurate approach
to the robustness of the network (Boccaletti et al., 2007).
This procedure can be used to assess di↵erences in vulnerability between
airline alliance route networks (AARNs). As shown in Table 1, AARNs have
really di↵erent numbers of nodes and edges, so the measures of vulnerability
have to be normalized in order to be able to compare graphs. One possible
normalization procedure can be defined by using the graphs of N nodes with
minimum and maximum vulnerability: the complete and the string graphs,
respectively. A complete graph of N nodes is a fully connected graph where
each node has N   1 edges. It is easy to see that the complete graph has
a minimum vulnerability, which is b(Gcomplete) = 1. On the other hand, a
path graph of N nodes can be defined as a string of nodes attached to its
neighbors. Each node has two edges, except the two end nodes of the string
that just have one. This graph has the highest vulnerability among all graphs
of N nodes. Mishkovski et al. (2011) proposed a normalization for b(G) as:
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bnor(G) =
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This normalization can be extended for other scales of vulnerability where
p 6= 1. Considering the multi-scale approach on a complete graph, one can
easily see that (bp(Gcomplete))p 1 = 1. For the path graph, although it is
known that b1(Gpath) =
N(N+1)
6 , this simplification cannot be extended for
p > 1. Despite that, it is easy to see that bp(Gcomplete)  b(G)  bp(Gpath).
As a consequence, the normalization of the multi-scale measure of the vul-
nerability of a graph is defined as:
bpnor(G) =
bp(G)  bp(Gcomplete)
bp(Gpath)  bp(Gcomplete) =
bp(G)  1
bp(Gpath)  1 (4)
where Gpath and Gcomplete have the same number of nodes as G.
2.2. Size of the giant component
An alternate method to assess robustness is to examine the decrease of
the size of the giant component when a fraction f of nodes is isolated through
an strategy-specific approach (Grubesic et al., 2008). To test network toler-
ance to errors, the nodes to isolate are selected at random and to test the
network’s tolerance to attacks the selected nodes must play a vital role in
maintaining network connectivity (Albert et al., 2000). The simulation of
an attack on an air transport network allows us to detect its critical air-
ports in terms of network connectivity (Lordan et al., 2014b). To select the
nodes to isolate, several node selection criteria can be adopted. For instance,
Jahanpour and Chen (2013) define criteria based on degree, betweenness,
closeness and eigenvector centralities. In this study the robustness to inten-
tional attacks for each AARN attack will be analyzed using six di↵erent node
selection criteria: degree, betweenness, modal analysis (Petreska et al., 2010),
damage (Latora and Marchiori, 2005), Bonacich power (Bonacich, 1987) and
inverted e ciency. For the first five criteria an adaptive strategy is adopted:
each time a node is isolated the measure for node selection is recalculated for
all the nodes that are still connected and the node with the highest value is
selected to be disconnected in the following step. This analysis uses a new
way to analyze the robustness of a network, named as inverted e ciency.
For this purpose two new features are introduced altogether: the use of e -
ciency for assessing the robustness of a complex network and how to invert
the adaptive strategy.
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2.2.1. E ciency
Latora and Marchiori (2001, 2003) introduced the e ciency of a network
as an indicator of its own tra c capacity as:
E =
1
N(N   1)
X
i 6=j
1
dij
(5)
In the robustness analysis carried out on the global air transport network
(Lordan et al., 2014b) observed that the decrease in the e ciency of the
network has a similar evolution to the decrease in the size of the giant com-
ponent. Therefore, a promising criterion of node selection for maximizing at-
tack e↵ectiveness could be selecting the node whose disconnection causes the
maximal decrease in e ciency. If an adaptive strategy is used, the decrease
in e ciency caused by the isolation of each of the remaining nodes must be
recalculated for the next iteration. Previous research (Petreska et al., 2010;
Jahanpour and Chen, 2013; Lordan et al., 2014b) has used and created cri-
teria based on node measures to attack the network. To our knowledge this
is the first criterion that uses network measure for node isolation.
2.2.2. The inverted adaptive strategy: Inverting the procedure
When following an adaptive strategy, the usual (direct) procedure to at-
tack a network consists of starting with the connected network, and then
disconnecting nodes one by one –selected following a criterion recalculated
for each disconnection– that might bring a decrease in the size of the giant
component which is as large as possible, recalculating the value of the crite-
rion for all remaining nodes each time a node is isolated. For each criterion
it is possible to construct an inverted procedure, beginning with an isolated
network and adding –activating– nodes and keeping the giant component as
small as possible. The edges considered for computing the size of the giant
component are those between activated nodes and the process ends when all
the nodes in the original network are activated. The direct adaptive strat-
egy starts with the original network and aims to disconnect the most central
or important nodes as soon as possible, while the inverted adaptive strategy
(IAS) presented starts from an empty network and aimds to connect the most
important nodes as late as possible.
A good starting point for an IAS is to compute the betweenness centrality
for the nodes of the whole network and select, for activation, the nodes with
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betweenness centrality equal to zero. These nodes are among the last ones to
be disconnected with the usual direct procedures, and the network obtained
by considering the edges linking these nodes should have a giant component
with a value of zero or one. The node selection procedure will be di↵erent
for criteria based on node measures and on network measures:
• Node measures : for node measures such as degree or betweenness the
node to be selected in each step is the one that, when activated, has
the smallest value of the measure among the non-activated nodes.
• Network measures : in the straight version of the network measures
criteria, the node to be disconnected is the one whose disconnection
minimizes network e ciency. For the IAS, the node to be activated
will be the one whose activation maximizes network e ciency.
In the first activations of the IAS there can be a lot of equal measures
between nodes. A possible criterion for distinguishing between these equal
measures is to select the node with the lowest value of betweenness centrality
in the initial network. For illustrative purposes, Figure 1 exemplifies this
procedure, showing each step of an IAS based on the degree criterion. The
graph to study is the one shown in Figure 1a. The first step is to take its
nodes and generate an empty graph (see Figure 1b), where all nodes are
deactivated. To initiate the process, the betweenness for all nodes of the
original graph is calculated: bi = (26, 0, 0, 0, 0, 25, 8, 0, 0, 0). Then, all nodes
with zero betweenness are activated (see Figure 1c).
Following the IAS, in each iteration the non-activated node with min-
imum degree has to be activated. For instance, in the first iteration the
non-activated nodes are A, F and G (see Figure 1c). If A were activated its
resulting degree would be 4 with A-B, A-C, A-J and A-I connections. In the
same way the degrees of F and G would be 2 (F-E and F-D) and 1 (G-H) in
this iteration, respectively. As G is one of the nodes with minimum degree
it is the node to be activated in the first iteration (see Figure 1d) and only
adding the connection G-H.
For the second iteration the non-activated nodes are only A and F. If
activated, A would have a degree of 4 and F a degree of 3. Therefore, F is
the node to activate in the second step (see Figure 1e). Finally, there is just
A left to activate (see Figure 1f) and the process ends since all nodes have
been activated.
6
3. Results
3.1. Topology of alliances’ route networks
The three current global airline alliances (Star Alliance, SkyTeam and
oneworld) have been included in the study. These three alliances o↵er around
9, 136 routes, which represents 36% of the routes IN the global ATN. It must
be said, however, that the routes o↵ered by all alliances represent around
two-thirds of total industry capacity (Gaggero and Bartolini, 2012). There-
fore, routes operated by alliances are among the most important in terms of
passengers and revenue in the entire airline industry.
An AARN has been constructed for each alliance in which the edges are
the routes where at least one of the alliance members acts as the marketing
airline and the nodes are the airports covered by the set of routes. Air route
data have been obtained from the Schedule Reference Service (SRS), a neu-
tral database of scheduled flights complied by IATA (http://www.iata.org/
publications/srs/Pages/index.aspx). Codesharing flights have been in-
cluded considering that alliances are formed by airlines from all around the
world and it would be di cult to find an area where they are not operating.
Therefore, it has been considered that alliances have no spoke airports that
depend on an intermediate hub. Airports are selected as nodes rather than
cities, given that airports are the likely target of an intentional attack. The
set of marketed routes is the route portfolio that the alliance o↵ers to its
customers and it therefore makes more sense to assess the robustness of this
set instead of the smaller set of operating routes.
To define the network, a time horizon has been considered that includes
the period from December 2011 to March 2012 and all alliances have a stable
number of members. In this period three changes to alliance membership
took place: Ethiopian Airlines (ET) became a member of Star Alliance in
December 2011; in April 2012 bmi British Midland (BD) left Star Alliance;
and Air Berlin (AB) entered oneworld. Therefore, the routes marketed by
each AARN between December 2011 and March 2012 define the edges of each
network that link to the operating airports. These routes have been obtained
from the SRS database. As the majority of connections are reciprocal, the
three alliance networks have been treated as an undirected network (Guimera`
et al., 2005). The AARNs have been considered as unweighted networks,
since the purpose of this research is to assess the e↵ect of a total disconnection
of airports from the alliance network.
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A network’s vulnerability to errors and attacks depends on its topology.
Scale-free networks, that is, networks whose degree distribution follows a
power law, are usually resilient to errors but have low tolerance to attacks
(Zanin and Lillo, 2013). Table 1 shows the values of the main topological
properties for the three alliances. When compared with the global ATN
(Lordan et al., 2014b), the AARNs have smaller values of average path length
and L and higher values of clustering coe cient C (the ATN has L = 3.94
and C = 0.64). Thus, all the AARNs have the small-world property and also
a high clustering coe cient.
Figure 2 shows the degree and betweenness cumulative distributions for
each AARN, in a log-log scale. The three AARNs have a similar cumulative
degree distribution (that is, the probability that a given node has a degree
of value k), which follows a truncated power-law distribution but with a
less stark truncation than that obtained for the global ATN. Similarly, the
cumulative betweenness distribution but similar for the three AARNs, and
also follows a truncated power-law distribution thus showing the presence
of a subset of airports with high values of betweenness centrality for each
alliance. Degree and betweenness cumulative distributions of alliances could
be smoother than the ones for the global ATN for two reasons: on the one
hand, a large set of airports with low degree (i.e., with few connections)
present in the global ATN are not covered by airline alliances, and on the
other hand, each alliance has a subset of airports with a high number of
connections and high betweenness centrality, compared to the global ATN
which includes all of them.
A distinctive feature for Star Alliance is shown in Figure 3, which com-
pares the betweenness and the degree for each airport and each alliance. The
Star Alliance graph shows a similar pattern to that observed for the global
ATN (considering nodes as airports or nodes as cities as in Guimera` et al.
(2005)): the appearance of nodes with a high value of betweenness and a
low value of degree. In the other two graphs, however, a strong correlation
between degree and betweennesscan be observed, with no airports showing
a pattern of low degree and high betweenness. On the other hand, Star Al-
liance has a more continuous distribution of degree and betweenness, while
the other two alliances have airports with values of degree and betweenness
that are much higher than the rest (i.e., one in the case of oneworld and three
for SkyTeam).
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3.2. Robustness of airline alliance route networks
Figure 4 shows the multi-scale vulnerability measures for the three al-
liances for values of p ranging from 1 to 50. In order to compare the vul-
nerability of each alliance the values of the multi-scales measures have been
normalized following the procedure described in subsection 2.1. The results
show that Star Alliance is the alliance with lowest values of vulnerability,
followed by SkyTeam and oneworld, respectively. Therefore, according to
this measure, oneworld seems to have the most vulnerable network and Star
Alliance the most robust one.
Figure 5 shows an alternative assessment of the robustness of the alliances
route network: the evolution of the size of the giant component when a
fraction f of the nodes is isolated. The criteria used to select the nodes are
described in subsection 2.2: betweenness, degree, Bonacich power, damage,
modal analysis and inverted e ciency. As all node criteria disconnect the
networks when f > 9%, this value has been adopted as the threshold for
Figure 5. At first glance, it can be seen that while node selection criteria
give di↵erent results for Star Alliance and SkyTeam the results for all criteria
are quite similar for oneworld. A possible explanation for the behavior of
oneworld comes from its topological properties: Figure 3 shows that oneworld
is the alliance whose betweenness and degree are most correlated as all its
nodes with high degree have also high betweenness. It can also be observed
that oneworld appears to be as the least robust network, as for f ' 2.5 the
giant component has decreased significantly.
As for Star Alliance and SkyTeam, thenode selection criteria o↵er di↵er-
ent results, with a similar pattern to the one obtained for the global ATN.
The most e↵ective criteria to select nodes to attack the Star Alliance and
SkyTeam networks turns out to be betweenness and inverted e ciency (see
Figure 5). In fact, it can be observed that inverted e ciency anticipates the
significant falls in size of the giant component obtained with betweenness.
For values of f around 2% and 2.5% inverted e ciency is the most e↵ective
criteria in both networks. The greater performance of betweenness com-
pared to the rest of the criteria, except inverted e ciency for Star Alliance
and SkyTeam can also be explained in terms of the degree vs betweenness
graphs in Figure 3. Figure 6 shows the detailed decrease in the size of the gi-
ant component for f  2%. For low values of f , damage is the most e↵ective
way of attacking all AARN. More precisely, in all cases damage overcomes
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the rest of the node selection criteria until the first break is obtained through
betweenness and inverted e ciency.
The Star Alliance topology replicates, to some extent, a property observed
in Guimera` et al. (2005) for the global ATN: the existence of central (i.e.,
high betweenness), low-connected (i.e., low degree) nodes. This property is
less salient in the case of SkyTeam, but nevertheless this alliance also has
a multicommunity structure where there are some central airports with a
connectedness lower than expected, considering its network centrality.
From the results of the analysis reported in Figure 5, the most robust
AARN to intentional attacks is the Star Alliance network, followed by SkyTeam
and oneworld. Using the betweenness or inverted e ciency node selection
criteria, the first network break –a significant decrease in the size of the gi-
ant component– occurs for values of f ' 1.5% for oneworld, f ' 2% for
SkyTeam and f ' 2.5% for Star Alliance (for the first two alliances, the first
break can be observed in detail in Figure 6). When attacked the size of the
giant component of Star Alliance falls abruptly with one single break, while
for the other alliances the disruption of the giant component occurs in two
steps. Interestingly, the results of ranking the robustness of alliances by a
decrease in size of the giant component are the same as the standardized
multi-scale vulnerability (see Figure 4).
4. Conclusions
Airline alliances are an idiosyncratic mode of coordinating airline oper-
ations that allow airlines to provide customers worldwide mobility through
collaboration with other airlines. The routes marketed by any of the members
of the alliance define the airline alliance route network, or AARN. Although
no alliance covers the entire global air transport network (ATN), all three
alliances have a global reach and their routes are among the most important
in the ATN, both by revenue and passengers transported. The AARNs are
networks with a truncated power-law distribution, the small-world property
(i.e., low average path length) and a high clustering coe cient. The Star Al-
liance network is the most similar to the global ATN, since it includes central
airports (i.e., airports with high betweenness centrality) with low connected-
ness (i.e., with low degree). For SkyTeam and oneworld a strong correlation
between node degree and betweenness is observed.
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The robustness of AARNs has been analyzed through two methods: the
multi-scale measure of vulnerability, defined in Boccaletti et al. (2007), and
the study of the e↵ect on the size of giant component of the isolation of
a fraction f of the airports covered by the alliance following several node
selection criteria. In order to allow a network vulnerability comparison, a
normalization procedure has been defined for multi-scale vulnerability. To
perform the latter analysis, the inverted adaptive strategy (IAS) for defin-
ing node selection criteria has been defined. Rather than starting with the
connected network and trying to disconnect it as soon as possible, IAS starts
with a disconnected network, and adds new nodes in order to connect the
original network as late as possible. From the results of this robustness anal-
ysis of the global ATN, it is considered convenient to define a IAS in the
analysis based on reducing network e ciency.
Both methods of assessing network vulnerability coincide in that the most
robust AARN is the Star Alliance route network, followed by SkyTeam and
oneworld. In all cases, the node selection criterion based on damage is the
most e↵ective for low values of f (around 2%), while betweenness and in-
verted e ciency are most e↵ective for higher values of f (between 2% and
9%). The latter criteria disconnect the networks through breaks (abrupt
reductions in the giant component). In fact, betweenness and inverted ef-
ficiency are the most e↵ective for values of f when the first break occurs.
The merit of the inverted e ciency criterion is that breaks appear before the
betweenness criteria. Therefore, the former is the most e↵ective for some
ranges of f . Interestingly, Star Alliance has a single break of the giant com-
ponent for f ' 2.5%, while in the other two AARNs two breaks occur and
of a size of around half the value of the break in Star Alliance.
Airline alliances have appeared for economic and operational reasons,
since they allow airlines to benefit from economies of scale and density. A
deeper insight into how AARNs are formed can include criteria based on
robustness in the decisions shaping alliance evolution. Airlines seeking par-
ticipation in an alliance should take into account the gain or loss of robust-
ness of their marketed route network after joining an alliance. On the other
hand, alliances seeking partners should balance the gain in coverage across
the network with the variation in robustness of their AARN.
The results of the analysis reported in this study allow for the comparison
of the results of robustness of the alliance route networks with those of the
global ATN. The next step is to assess the robustness of individual airlines
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route network. It must be noted that individual airlines have features that
should make their network di↵erent from the AARNs and the global ATN.
First, airline route networks do not have the global scope of alliances and
second, airline route networks depend on the business model adopted by each
airline.
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Figure 1: Example of the inverted adaptive strategy. Grey circles: activated; white
squares: desactivated
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Figure 2: Degree (k) and betweenness (b) cumulative distributions for each alliance
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N E hki L C ⌫
Star Alliance 1, 150 4, 240 7.37 3.24 0.77 < 0
SkyTeam 896 3, 226 7.20 3.13 0.74 < 0
oneworld 741 1, 670 4.51 3.28 0.71 < 0
Table 1: Main topological properties of AARNs. The quantities measured are: number
of vertices N , number of edges E, characteristic path length L, clustering coe cient C,
average degree hki, and type of correlations.
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Figure 3: Betweennes (b) as a function of degree (k) for each alliance
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Figure 4: AARNs multi-scale vulnerability comparison
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Figure 5: Vulnerability of AARNs f  9%
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Figure 6: Vulnerability of AARNs. Detail: f  2%
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